Abstract. While code obfuscation attempts to hide certain characteristics of a program independently of an application, white-box cryptography (WBC) specifically focuses on software implementations of cryptographic primitives in an application. The aim of WBC is to resist attacks from an adversary having access to some 'executable' code with an embedded secret key. WBC, if possible, would have several applications. However, unlike obfuscation, it lacks a theoretical foundation. We present a first step towards a theoretical model of WBC via white-box security notions. We also present some positive and negative results on WBC and obfuscation. In particular, we show that for most interesting programs (such as an encryption algorithm), there are security notions that cannot be satisfied when the adversary has white-box access, while they are satisfied when it has black-box access. On the positive side, we show that there exists an obfuscator for a symmetric encryption scheme in the context of a useful security-notion (such as IND-CPA).
Introduction
White-box cryptography (WBC) aims to protect cryptographic keys embedded in a program that is in the control of an attacker. The attacker can conduct nonblack-box attacks (such as code inspection, execution environment modification, code modification, etc). Practical white-box implementations of DES and AES encryption algorithms were proposed in [9, 10] . However, no formal definitions of white-box cryptography were given, neither were there any proofs of security. With their subsequent cryptanalysis [4, 15, 22] , it remains an open question whether or not such white-box implementations exist.
Our Contribution: The contributions of this work are two-fold: (1) we formalize white-box cryptography using a white-box property (WBP) that captures the security of an obfuscation with respect to an application, and (2) we present some (im)possibility results about WBP and obfuscation. We show that for most programs, there do not exist obfuscators satisfying WBP for all applications in which P may be used. On the positive side, we show that there exist obfuscators satisfying WBP for a meaningful program and application.
Notation and Preliminaries
Denote by P the set of all polynomials with coefficients in [0..∞] and by TM the set of all Turing Machines (TMs). For X ∈ TM, |X| is the length of the string description of X. A mapping f :
A PPT Algorithm is a TM with an unknown source of randomness with running time polynomial in the length of known inputs. A Turing Machine Family (TMF) is a TM with two read tapes: a key and an input. For any TMF Q, we denote Q's key-space (valid strings of the key tape) of length k by K k Q , and the resulting TM when Q's key tape contains q by Q[q] ∈ TM. For any q ∈ K k Q , the input-space of Q[q] is fully defined by k, and we denote this space by I k Q . A TMF Q is a Polynomial TMF (PTMF) if:
Denote by PPT and PTF the set of all PPT algorithms and PTMFs respectively.
and ∀a : if Q[q](a) halts after t steps then X(a) halts in ≤ p(t) steps.
and if Q[q](a) halts after t steps then X(a) halts in ≤ p(t) steps.
Denote by LF and ALF the set of all LFs and ALFs respectively.
Obfuscation
Informally, an obfuscator O transforms a program P into O(P ), which is functionally equivalent to P but hides certain characteristics of P . The following definitions are adapted from the literature [16, 1, 11, 19, 21, 18, 17, 14, 8] . Let Q ∈ PTF. We consider the obfuscation of Q[q] (an instantiation of Q with key q). Let O : PTF × {0, 1} * → PTM be a PPT algorithm.
Definition 3 (Correctness).
O is an obfuscator for Q if:
Soundness is defined using a Virtual Black-Box Property (VBBP) [1, 17, 18] . let Q[q] be a random instantiation of a PTMF Q using key q. The VBBP requires that whatever information about q a PPT adversary extracts from O(Q, q), a PPT simulator should also be able to extract with black-box access to Q[q]. Existing notions of VBBP fall into one of two broad categories as defined below.
Definition 4 (Soundness)
. O is sound if at least one of following holds:
Note that indistinguishability is too strong to yield interesting results [18, 21] . On the other hand, predicate VBBP is too weak to be meaningful in practice [1, 18] . Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a meaningful definition of soundness falling somewhere between the two extremes can be formulated. We show this is not the case. Specifically, we show that, under every definition of soundness, for every Q / ∈ ALF, there exist (contrived) security notions for which white-box security fails but the corresponding black-box construction is secure.
White-Box Cryptography
We formalize white-box cryptography using a white-box property (WBP), which is defined using a game-based approach [2, 3, 12, 13] . Loosely speaking, the WBP is defined using two objects: a PTMF (such as an encryption algorithm family) and a security notion (such as IND-CPA). A security notion (SN) is a formal description of the security desired from a cryptographic scheme.
n is an n-tuple of PTMFs, and Extr and Win are TMs of the type {0,
* → {0, 1} respectively. Denote by SN the set of all security notions. For any sn = (n, p in , Q, Extr, Win) ∈ SN and any Q ∈ PTF, we say Q ∈ sn if Q ∈ Q. Definition 6. A Black-box Game given in Algorithm 1 (GameBB A ) is a TM interacting with the adversary A ∈ PPT. It takes as input (1 k , sn, r), where sn = (n, p in , Q, Extr, Win) ∈ SN is a security notion, and r ∈ {0, 1} pin(k) is a string (representing randomness). It outputs 0 or 1.
At any instant A can query at most one oracle, and each query by the adversary takes one unit time irrespective of the amount of computation involved. Queries is a set of ordered 4-tuples of type indicating respectively, the time, oracle, input, and the output of each query. Define AdvBB
Discussion. Consider the IND-CCA2 security notion for symmetric encryption, which is defined as a game with three stages: (1) the adversary queries the encryption/decryption oracles; (2) the adversary obtains a challenge ciphertext; and (3) the adversary queries the oracles as in (1) except that decryption queries on the challenge ciphertext are disallowed. The adversary wins if it guesses some property of the challenge ciphertext. An example is given in Appendix A.
Let E = (G, E, D) be any IND-CCA2 secure symmetric encryption scheme with the encryption/decryption key instantiated to K. Observe that the adversary cannot be given an obfuscation of D[K], since this will render E insecure under IND-CCA2 -once the adversary gets this obfuscation, we cannot prevent it from querying D[K] (via the obfuscation) on the challenge ciphertext in phase (3). On the other hand, E[K] is a candidate for obfuscation because the winning condition does not depend on queries to E[K]. We generalize this intuition in Definition 7 to describe when a family is a candidate for obfuscation.
Definition 7.
For any sn ∈ SN and any PTMF Q i ∈ sn, define Queries(i) to be the following set:
∀r, Queries, s : Win(r, Queries, s) = Win(r, Queries(i), s) .
In other words, Q i ∈ obf sn if: (1) Q i ∈ sn, and (2) in the black-box game, the output of Win is invariant w.r.t the entries of Queries for
Observe that a meaningful notion of white-box security cannot exist for a family under a security notion in which it is not obfuscatable. For instance, whiteboxing the decryption oracle of a symmetric encryption scheme, or the 'signing' oracle of a MAC scheme under standard security notions is not meaningful.
where for any function f A (k), max(f A (k)) is defined as follows: Let A ∈ PPT be such that ∀A ∈ PPT :
The following two definitions capture white-box security.
Negative Results
Barak et al. [1] give several impossibility results on obfuscation; their main result implies that there do not exist obfuscators satisfying UWBP for every Q ∈ PTF. However, they do not rule out obfuscators satisfying UWBP for a useful family Q. Our main negative result is stronger -there do not exist obfuscators satisfying UWBP for 'interesting' families. That is, we show that for any nonapproximately-learnable family, there exists a security notion that cannot be satisfied when an adversary has white-box access to the program (Theorem 1). Theorem 1. For every (Q, O) ∈ PTF\ALF × PPT, there exists sn ∈ SN such that Q ∈ obf sn but O fails to satisfy WBP for (Q, sn).
Proof. Let Q ∈ PTF\ALF. Let guess-x = (2, p in , Q, Extr, Win) ∈ SN be such that Q = (Q, Q 1 ); p in (k) = 2k + P Q (k); and other details in Algorithm 3.
Note that Q ∈ obf guess-x. Since Q / ∈ ALF, therefore due to Definitions 1 and 3, the following two inequalities are guaranteed to hold:
where α, β are negligible functions. Hence, we have that AdvWB guess-x O,Q (k) is larger than 1−α(k)−β(k), which is non-negligible in k. This proves the theorem. Parse r as (q, x, a); Simultaneous Obfuscation may be Insecure. When two families in the same SN are white-boxed, a useful question is whether the resulting implementation remains secure assuming that it was secure when each family was separately white-boxed. Theorem 2 states that simultaneous white-boxing of two families can be insecure even if white-boxing of each family separately is secure.
Theorem 2. For every (Q i , Q j , O) ∈ (PTF\ALF) 2 × PPT, there exists sn ∈ SN with Q i , Q j ∈ obf sn such that even if O satisfies WBP for (Q i , sn) and (Q j , sn), it fails to satisfy WBP for ((Q i , Q j ), sn). (See the full version [20] for proof.)
Positive Results
Although Theorem 1 rules out obfuscators satisfying UWBP for most non-trivial families, it does not imply that meaningful security in WBC cannot exist. In fact, any asymmetric encryption scheme can be considered as a white-boxed version of some symmetric scheme. We use this observation as a starting point of our first positive result. A similar observation was used in the positive results of [17] .
Theorem 3 (WBP for "Useful" Families). There exists a tuple (O, Q, sn) ∈ PPT × PTF\ALF × SN such that Q ∈ obf sn and O is an obfuscator satisfying WBP for (Q, sn) under reasonable computational assumptions.
